Oil conflict in the Niger Delta

I. Introduction

The objective of this case-studies is to increase awareness about the socio-political context of doing business. The idea that most Westerners have of the relations between state and society is the following :

• 1. Different actors in society (State, business and civil society) share power

• 2. The State represents the interests of the population through implementing laws that protect the population.

• 3. The State plays a role as an arbiter in disputes and makes judgements according to a transparent set of rules.

The reality in a country like Nigeria does not correspond to this model. The State for example does not represent the interests of the entire population but only the interests of a narrow elite, there is a collusion between political leaders and business actors, and while legislation intended to protect social and economic rights of citizens exists, it is not applied. A combination of frustration over the extraction of oil and lack of development in the oil-producing region on the hand and the lack of political space to express grievances and demand for accountability has led to increasing levels of violence in the Niger Delta. The conflict has changed over time and people whose frustrations are not being addressed seek other ways of expressing themselves that cannot be ignored. The tragedy of the conflict in the Niger delta is that violence seems to be the only language that actors pick up from each other, without having the capacity to decipher the message behind the violence. This is what this case-study tries to do. It will focus on how the conflict between Shell and the oil producing communities is embedded in wider state-society relations.

In terms of methodology, the case study takes as its starting point the interview with Shell Country Chair, Basil Omiye, when he was in New York to address the United National Global Compact. Basil Omiye’s opinions on the conflict(s) in the Niger Delta, their possible solutions and his views about the company’s responsibility, are compared with the discourse of other actors in society. How do government, communities, NGO’s and militia frame the conflict and which solutions do they formulate? Placing Shell’s interpretation in a wider perspective helps us to understand the complex relationship between business and wider society. The fact that a video and a transcription of the interview are available on Shell’s website is a sign that the company endorses Omiye’s statements, which I therefore take as a reflection of the company’s official position. While the case study focuses on Shell (1), we have to realise that it is but one of many oil company in the region.

II. Link between business in conflict

Doing business in zones of conflict comprises important business risks as a result of a lack of security and a volatile political situation. The following risks have important financial consequences for companies:

• Risk for damage or loss of infrastructure;

• Ppossible production loss;

• Security risks for personnel and costs for taking security measures;

• Paying “taxes” and protection money to warring parties;

• In case of regime change, companies can be punished by a new regime for their ‘support’ to the former regime. For example in the case of withdrawing contracts and/or licenses;

• Involvement in conflict also involves a risk for a company’s image (might lose customers and orders).

Despite above risks, numerous companies operate in conflict zones. How to explain this? A first factor is the link between a type of activity and conflict. The extraction of natural resources for example is particularly conflict prone because it is conducive to environmental degradation, unequal distribution of resources, a rent economy and payments which can be used to finance war (2). A second factor is that the extraction of natural resources is linked to a specific geographical area, the activity can therefore not be moved to another location if the tensions are rising, contrary to most production processes. Nigeria is a typical case in this category. Conflict experts describe the situation in the oil-rich Niger Delta as a low-intensity intrastate conflict. Newspapers account regularly of sabotage of oil pipe lines, abduction of employees and continued fighting among youth militia (3). Over the last 20 years, the conflict has transformed from non-violent protests to armed conflict with youth movements of ethnic groups having formed into military wings (4). The conflict has further transformed the economy in the region into a war economy. As a result of conflict, Shell had to close its oil fields in Ogoniland in Rivers State and the overall oil trade is losing $5bn a year as a result of sabotage . Nevertheless the company chooses to pursue their activity in the Niger Delta and therefore business and conflict do go together in some cases.

Companies as actors in conflict

When confronted with conflict, either in the area where the company is located or through being a target, a usual response is to demand for military protection. This is a logic reflex, especially if one comes from a country where the military is under democratic control. Under oppressive forms of government, the army is an extension of an illegitimate regime. The association with the military automatically positions a company in the conflict. This is a typical problem of doing business in zones of conflict. Even though a company might not see itself taking part in the conflict, if the population feels it does because it collaborates with the military regime, the communities might target the company as a strategy to put pressure on the regime. This is what has happened in Nigeria in 1995 with the trial against Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other members of the Ogoni tribe who were leaders in the MOSOP mouvement for the Survival of the Ogoni people. Shell’s oil installations were targeted and resistance was so strong that they had to close their oil fields in the region while the company insisted and continues to insist that it is not an actor in the conflict but that the conflict is between the State and the local populations. The oil fields have not re-opened at the time of writing. So while companies might not see themselves as actors in conflict, when other actors do, they can become targets. This is one of the reasons why business – society relations are important.

‘Blood Oil’

A spiral of violence has given rise to a war economy in the Niger Delta. The sabotaging of oil pipelines has grown to an immense industry. Here follows an example of how it works: a small ship sails under a pipeline, the pipeline is broken, the ship is filled up and sails off several times to fill up a tanker off shore. Shell’s Country Director Basil Omiye comments on this phenomenon that: “They [those behind oil sabotage] don’t do proper jobs so they leave huge oil pollution in the wake of what they do. Because it’s a criminal trade, a lot of arms are imported to protect the trade so that they can fight off government security forces. And of course, it completely destroys all the economy in the region and people won’t want to do anything else if there is such an easy thing to do. Why would they want to go into agriculture or provide a service?”

The sabotage of oil pipelines serves as income for those who perform these acts and is used to purchase arms. Arms are a source of power and permit groups to protect a territory and to protect the business they have set up, which leads to continued sabotage and strengthens the phenomenon. A network of illicit trade functions in the shadow of the formal business. It also has an impact on local power relations and modes of governance. The hereditary authority of customary leaders and elders is undermined at the benefit of young men with guns. The president of Nigeria Umuru Yar’Adua referred to this phenomenon as “blood oil” during a meeting with the G8. The term is an allusion to blood diamonds (5) and the successful international campaign against those (6).

III. Relationship between actors: Blur between government and business actors

Conflict in the Niger Delta is the result of a complex dynamic between foreign and state-owned companies, different levels of government, communities and increasingly armed militia. Military and private security agencies are deemed to be under respectively government and company control but, at times, can also be interpreted as conflict actors by themselves. Ideas about the responsibilities that different actors have towards the conflict and the communities that are affected, diverge.

• First of all, people living in communities do not make a clear distinction between oil companies and local and state government (7). One reason is that Shell Nigeria, officially the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC), is a joint venture between Shell and the state-owned enterprise NNPC.

• A second reason is that, as a result of the State’s failure to invest in development in the oil-rich region, oil companies decided to provide services and infrastructure. The company therefore becomes an actor in the social development of a region. This confusion is reinforced when a company like Shell relies for its security on military personnel, linking it to the Federal government.

Shell as actor in development

Shell has become an important actor in development of the Niger Delta. On its website we can read that Shell Nigeria’s approach is “Community Development; to empower the communities by helping to build their capacity and confidence to take the lead role in decisions for their own development,” through Health Care, Youth Development and Sports, education and Business Development (8).

The first of these community development efforts were undertaken in the 1980s and the first project by Shell dated 1992. ‘Community Development’ work usually boils down to the company signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with a host community. As part of the MoU, the community promises to grant access to oil wells near their village and not to cause disturbances. In turn, the company will assist the community, usually by providing infrastructure such as a road, water supply or a health post. For this, it has set up Shell Community Development (SCD) (9). The Bonn International Centre for Conversion comments however that community development has been largely unsuccessful and the stories about failed, abandoned and obsolete projects are many. Companies have falsely (or at least, controversially) reported some activities as community development; an example would be the building of roads to their own facilities, roads that were of no use to the villagers. On the other hand, development efforts have often been undertaken on the basis of demands from a community, rather than an assessment of the needs of this community. This has led to some curious decisions regarding priorities (10).

When asked about Shell’s decision to take up roles that are generally associated with government Shell’s Country Director Basil Omiye recognises the blur effect and argues that “there was no way we couldn’t even respond to the need on the ground. [..] [But] there’s no chance you can ever be a substitute for the government [..]. So we do recognise that and our dilemma [..]” As Omiye mentions here, Shell’s relationship with the governments presents a dilemma for the company. As a result of being associated with it, it has become a target of NGO’s campaigns during the Ogoni resistance with Ken Saro-Wiwa as its spokesperson. The Ogoni see Shell as the entity through which royalties and taxes went to the central -and military- government at that time. Omiye stresses that the key problem of Shell’s image in the Ogoni disaster is not a result of conflict between Shell and the communities but between the central government and the communities: “The issue is about the Ogoni and Nigeria, [it] is really about ownership of the resource on the ground.” Omiye feels that Shell has no responsibility in this case: “[..] the companies had to work according to the law of the land. And, you know, if the law of the land has said tax and royalty went to the local people, the companies would pay it to the local people.” Omiye interprets the expectations of people in the Niger Delta towards Shell as playing the role of an advocate. “If you really ask the people of the region in the end, [..]‘what do you want from companies?’ [..] they just say we just want you to be advocates for us with the government. I love to do [that] as Country Chair, talking in central government level or any fora wherever poverty and development is discussed.” (11)

Omiye’s enthusiasm to speak for Niger Delta communities in development fora stands in stark contrast with Shell’s hesitation to speak out for the community activists, among whom Ken Saro Wiwa, when he and other MOSOP leaders risked hanging in 1995. Shell stated that it would be “dangerous and wrong” for Shell to “intervene and use its perceived ‘influence’ to have the judgement overturned,” stating that “a commercial organisation like Shell cannot and must never interfere with the legal processes of any sovereign state.” (12)

While Omiye stresses Shell’s respect for the formal channels and government as the only sovereign actor, he disregards the fact that government in Nigeria between 1993 and 1998 was a military dictatorship. While it enjoyed international recognition, it had no legitimacy within the country. Although multiparty elections were re-introduced in 1999, the Nigerian scholar and human rights activist, Austin Onuoha, argues that the term ‘civilian rule’ is more applicable that ‘democracy’. He thereby stresses that while governments are elected they are not necessarily legitimate. It is logic that companies working with illegitimate government are seen as illegitimate themselves, even though they “follow the laws of the land”. The next paragraph looks further into people’s opinions and expectations of Shell as an economic and social actor in the region.

Local perceptions of the state and the contradiction between development and security arrangements

Basil Omiye insists that the majority of the population values their presence: “I wish people would know how the ordinary people, not the campaigning NGO’s but ordinary citizens, they’ll be students, the odd 17,000 students on a Shell scholarship, the government who over three years from our own Shell operations alone received something like $25 billion in taxes and royalties. The hospitals we run, the infrastructure programs we have on the ground, the beneficiaries of all those, and the thousands of people, who are ancillary, how they value our presence.” Clearly, Omiye legitimises Shell’s presence through their contribution to development. Austin Onuahe confirms that nearby oil sites can be seen as substitutes for the absolute failure of state and local governments in providing services for the population. Onuoha visited one local government in 1999 and was informed “they were all gone”. When asked where they had all gone, a security man on duty said that they had shared the revenue allocation accruing to local governments from the Federation account for that month and had gone home to come back when the next allocation was due (13).

Yet Onuahu also describes how the credit oil companies build up can easily be lost in oil companies’ reliance on military solutions to tensions. A typical example comes from the 1989 Umuechem Uprising. When people in Umuechem demonstrated against neglect and marginalisation, Shell called upon the Mobile Police to intervene. The local population referred to this military force as “Kill and Go”. It resulted in a massacre and the destruction of hundreds of houses (14). The events in Umuechem are indicative for a wider phenomenon, which is that of the militarization of the conflict in the Niger Delta as a result of oil companies’ search for protection by ‘federal might’. The extra judicial killings; the sacking of entire communities and the military protection of oil companies’ top officials position the oil companies in the conflict between the population and the government on the side of the enemy.

Other security arrangements are ‘surveillance contracts’. They offer youth of communities in the Niger Delta money to protect oil installations. These arrangements, while understandable from the sire of the oil company, only reinforce the conflict. The company is caught in a zero- sum game, if it awards surveillance contracts, it will lead to conflict, if it does not, it will lead to vandalisation of their equipment.

While actors share a similar interest in benefiting from the oil reserves, they have very different readings about the causes of conflict. As long as these different realities are not acknowledged a solution for the conflict is unlikely.

IV. Different actors, different opinions about the causes of conflict

“How much more could be more done if we could just overcome a few issues of governance and anti-corruption, and looking after our children” (15).

In above quote Basil Omiye sums up what he sees as the obstacles to prosperity and peace in the Niger Delta: bad governance, corruption and the children not being properly looked after. In the interview, he refers twice to causes of conflict in the Niger Delta, once with regard to the Ogoni conflict, and once when commenting on economic crime. According to him, ownership of resources is at the root of the Ogoni conflict but he denies that social grievance also is a motor behind economic crime: “economic crime is an end in itself and completely unrelated to the question of poverty or social justice which you hear of talked about politically.”

The two types of conflicts Omiye mentions can however be compared on three points, firstly, their time frame, secondly the territory in which they take place and thirdly their relevance today. They are different because the conflict around the Ogoni resistance is a problem from the past and restricted to a small territory (Ogoniland), while economic crime is widespread and still growing. However, both remain at the order of the day because oil extraction in Ogoniland has not started since the explosion of violence in the early 1990’s and no reconciliation has been found yet with the Ogoni people. Battles have taken the shape of law courts and have moved from the Delta swamps to American courts. The Ogoni resistance has moreover inspired many communities to take action through violent as well as non-violent means.

What are other opinions on the causes of conflict in the Niger Delta? Onuahe argues that there are many different conflicts that overlap and whose combination has led to its explosive character. Austin Onuahe argues that the conflict in the Niger Delta can be de-constructed in a large number of overlapping conflicts (in order of intensity) that deal with:

• 1. Self-determination;

• 2. Resource control;

• 3. Citing of community development projects;

• 4. Oil spills and pipeline explosions;

• 5. Conflict between elders and youth;

• 6. Community disputes in associations;

• 7. Chieftaincy tussle;

• 8. Land dispute.

As a conclusion, “the conflict” in the Niger Delta exists of a series of incidents (Umuechem 1989, Hanging Ogoni Nine 1995), is localised in certain territories in the region (for example Ogoniland or Warri) and involves different ethnic groups (Ogoni, Igbo, Itsekiri) whom have developed their own violent and non-violent resistance movements (Mosop, MEND, etc.). The hanging of the Ogoni Nine has received most media attention worldwide and inflicted most damage to Shell’s reputation in Nigeria, but the event was a mere episode in a long saga.

Responsibility for the escalation of conflict and its resolution

Omiye does not recognise any company responsibility in the escalation of these conflicts, but is willing to contribute to solutions. With regard to the Ogoni conflict he comments: “We’ve tried to so many ways to reach a reconciliation. But you need to understand, like I said earlier, the issue is not about Shell and the Ogoni, if it was just between the Shell and the Ogoni it would have been resolved a long time ago. The issue is really about the Ogoni and Nigeria, [it] is about ownership of the resource on the ground.”

Omiye insists that Shell has no responsibility in the death Ken Saro-Wiwa: « I think Shell was such a … it was so unfair that Shell should be internationally connected with the death of Saro-Wiwa. There could be nothing further from the truth. » A recent event demonstrates their continued denial of responsibility. A settlement between Ken Saro-Wiwa jr. and Shell put an end to a trial before an American Court under the Alian Tort Claims Act. Shell agreed to pay 11 million euros in compensation so as to aid the « process of reconciliation, » but denied culpability in the killings. Shell’s subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), insisted that the compensation is a « humanitarian gesture » and not an acknowledgment of guilt (16).

Omiye acknowledges however responsibility in the Ogoni dispute with regard to environmental degradation of their land : « We’ve made a commitment to clean up the whole environment and restore the environment. That hopefully makes the peace between us and the Ogonis while the issue of future operatorship should be done by the … another partner in the venture rather than ourselves. We think that’s really probably the fastest way to resolve the matter. »

Beyond the Ogoni conflict, oil extraction and conflict are more intrinsically linked, which Shell has recognised (17). Despite the vast oil wealth of the Niger Delta, its societies can be described as resource-scarce and the promise of a large amount of money can disrupt social structures within a community and lead to friction or violence. BICC further comments that “compensation payments [to communities] turn out to be negative ‘cash assaults’ rather than positive rewards. At the same time, by neglecting protests but reacting to violence, Shell has created an environment in which violence is more or less ‘rewarded’” (18).

V. Unsuccessful responses : Solutions put forward

“The only solution we can put on the table is to work in a collaborative way with governments.”

According to Basil Omiye economic crime is unrelated to poverty and unrelated to claims for social justice. He says the government should deal with economic crime before other social issues “[..] we believe that, and most people believe that the economic crime needs to be dealt with if you will be able to get a chance of dealing with the other social issues in the region.” This can be summed up as the ‘security first’ approach, prioritising security over justice. The solutions Shell puts forward are therefore in first instance of a technical nature. An example are the Shell laboratories that are working on an oil certification scheme inspired by the Kimberly process for conflict diamonds. Shell further increases protection of its assets and targets the minimisation of spills through a “spill response process”.

Yet the paradox is that oil spills, although much criticized by the communities, are also provoked by communities because compensation claims bring financial resources to the community. The larger the size of the spill, the larger the compensation payment, so Shell has reported on several occasions that communities blocked the company access to the area of the spill. Technical solutions are therefore not sufficient. Shell further invests in education about environmental issues, and in a memorandum of understanding with community clusters for an early stoppage of oil spills. Omiye argues that other solutions are required in the political and economic domain, for which he feels no responsibility as a private actor. He says “[..] the bulk of it is to be worked by Nigerian people and the Nigerian government. But as corporate bodies, where they really can play a role, is to be catalysts in the development side;[..]" Civilian and political actors should review the constitution according to Shell’s country manager and adjust the redistribution of oil revenues. Furthermore institutions should be strengthened so they can provide law and order. Finally, and in spite of above statement that economic crime is unrelated to poverty, he sees economic development as part of the solution. Shell as a company contributes through financing development and bringing development partners to the table.

• The company’s position can therefore be summed up as a need for security of people and investment and a message: “we are not responsible, it is government, although we might help. We are just following the laws of the land”.

• The communities, although speaking with many voices, state their need of redistribution of resources and insist on the message: “our land has lost its fertility, our ponds are no longer the homes for fish. Loosing our ancestral lands represents the loss of meanings of our lives.”

• NGO’s speak in human rights and international activist language. They translate the local situation in global struggles.

• The militia’s position in short is that: “the oil belongs to our communities and therefore to us”. Militants don’t see the process of oil theft as stealing, they believe they are taking what is legitimately theirs from the companies and the government. “We are the legitimate owners of oil because it is found on our land” (19).

Limits to technical and military solutions.

Nigeria’s President Umuru Yar’Adu is calling on the international community to help Nigeria end the illicit trade in oil. Britain has promised (July 2008) military training to improve the Nigerian military Joint Task Force’s ability to police the Delta region. According to a source close to the former government of President Olusegun Obasanjo this is not a satisfactory solution for the simple reasons that cartels are run partly by politicians in the top echelons of Nigerian political life. According to the same source, military action is not a sufficient solution as it could destabilise the country through a coup or a civil war. The view that violence is counterproductive, is shared by activists in the Delta - albeit for different reasons.

Another solution put forward by Shell and the Nigerian government is the idea of ‘certifying oil’, based on the principle of the Kimberly process which entails the certification of diamonds in order to register and control trade and borders during in- and export. Where the comparison between the illicit trade in oil and those in diamonds fails is that in Nigeria there is:

• A presence of a foreign companies that extract oil;

• Grievance of local population, civil organisations and non-violent resistance from the start, illicit trade is a side factor to be introduced later;

• The Nigerian government has more control than in the case of Liberia, where the State was a key actor in the illicit trade at a certain point. Liberia’s then president Charles Taylor was in control of the trade networks while in the Niger Delta trade is organised by small groups in a dispersed way.

Problems with development

By the end of 1999 overall relations between Shell and the oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta (not only the Ogoni) had, if anything, worsened since the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, despite Shell’s efforts to improve community relations, in particular by increasing development spending and by professionalizing the management of its development projects. Although much of this deterioration could be attributed to the government’s failure to respond to the demands of the peoples in the delta, rather than to Shell’s own activities, the continuing problems also illustrate the difficulty of putting the fine words of the Statement of General Business Principles into practice.

VI. Responsibility Shell? What can business do in these context? Confusion between legality and legitimacy

The crux in this dialogue of the deaf is the difference between legality and legitimacy. While Omiye in his discourse insists on the contradiction between illicit and legal, the militia insist on their own legitimacy.

In addition to Omiye’s stress on sabotage as a source for illicit trade in relation to “blood oil”, the BBC speaks of ‘legal theft’. Their journalist, Andrew Walker, cites an anonymous source close to the government of former President Olusegun Obasanjo, explaining that with the connivance of officials from international oil companies, national oil parastatal officials and ships’ captains, oil can be stolen through the legitimate [read legal] process of lifting oil from the dock to the ship (20).

Shell claims in its 1995 publication on the ‘Ogoni Issue’ that the Nigerian legal system is the correct venue to resolve MOSOP’s demands - yet it is precisely the Nigerian ‘legal system’ which has allowed Shell to continue its environmental devastation. The repressive political arena in Nigeria has directly benefited the economic arena within which Shell Nigeria operates.

At the same time Bronwen Manby argues that “international law, while historically focused on relations between states, is also adapting to the new climate. Human rights groups and others have long argued that states have an obligation not only to respect human rights themselves but also to enforce human rights law against private actors, including companies. The increasing power of transnational corporations within the global economy has brought with it a corresponding awareness of the need for an international legal regime that places direct responsibilities on these companies. When the global resources of a transnational corporation are substantially larger than those of the country where it is operating, the government of that country may not be in a position to enforce international, or even domestic, law against the company at all; especially when the company often receives the diplomatic support of the first world state where it has its corporate headquarters” (21).

Notes

• (1) : Royal Dutch Shell works through its subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), which is a joint venture with a state enterprise. It also works with other partners in the Nigerian venture: NNPC for Government, Total and Agip.

• (2) : Duquet, N. “Oliemaatschappijen en het conflict in de Niger Delta” in Nauwelaerts, P. and Schramme A. (red) “Responsabilisering van bedrijven in conflictregio’s en landen met een zwakke overheid”, 2008, Roularta Books.

• (3) : BBC News, ‘Blood oil’ dripping from Nigeria, Abuja, Sunday, 27 July 2008

• (4) : Naanes, B. The political economy of oil and violence in the Niger Delta., ACAS Bulletin 68: 4-9, 2004.

• (5) : Ibid. 2

• (6) : When Umuru Yar’Adua called upon the international community to help Nigeria end the trade in “blood oil”, Britain promised military training to improve the Nigerian military Joint Task Force’s ability to police the Delta region. His motivation to frame the illicit trade in oil in this way for the audience of G8 leaders is to position it as an international problem. The term ‘blood oil’ is instrumental for the Nigerian government to obtain military aid, arguing that it deals with international criminal networks. This solution proposed presents the insecurity in the Niger Delta as a technical problem and bases itself on the assumption that if Nigeria would increase the performance of its military, the problem could be halted.

• (7) : Nigeria’s is a Federation, existing of states. The Niger delta for example exists of 9 states.

• (8) : Shell website, www.shell.com/home/content2/nigeria/society_environment/dir_community_development.html, consulted 29-06-09

• (9) : Who’s Minding the Store, The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Brief 32, Page 72, www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/briefs/brief32/brief32.pdf

• (10) : Who’s Minding the Store, The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Brief 32, Page 72, www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/briefs/brief32/brief32.pdf

• (11) : Interview with Basil Omiye, Shell’s Country Chair in Nigeria, United Nations, New York, 20/09/‘08 www-static.shell.com/static/media/downloads/press/nigeria/transcript_interview_basil_omiyi%20_sept2009.pdf, consulted 02/07/‘09

• (12) : “Clear Thinking in Troubled Times”, SPDC Press release, October 31, 1995.

• (13) : Onuaha, A. From Conflict to collaboration, P. 163

• (14) : Duquet, N. “Oliemaatschappijen en het conflict in de Niger Delta” in Nauwelaerts, P. and Schramme A. (red) “Responsabilisering van bedrijven in conflictregio’s en landen met een zwakke overheid”, 2008, Roularta Books. P.51

• (15) : Idem note 7.

• (16) : Daily Independent (Lagos), Nigeria: U.S.$15.5 Million Shell Compensation Divides Ogoni Bassey Udo and Rafiu Ajakaye, 10 June 2009.

• (17) : « Shell admits fuelling corruption », BBC News, Friday, 11 June, 2004, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3796375.stm accessed 14 January 2010.

• (18) : Who’s Minding the Store, The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Brief 32, Page 72, www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/briefs/brief32/brief32.pdf

• (19) : BBC News, ‘Blood oil’ dripping from Nigeria, Abuja, Sunday, 27 July 2008.

• (20) : Ibid 5.

• (21) : Bronwen Manby, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, « Shell in Nigeria: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Ogoni Crisis ».